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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota law prohibits the city of Minneapolis from
extending employment benefits to the domestic partners of city
1
workers. Nevertheless, on December 13, 2002 the Minneapolis
City Council approved by an 8-4 vote a measure requiring large
contractors with the city to provide benefits to their employees’
2
domestic partners. As a result, Minneapolis now requires city
contractors to provide benefits that the city itself cannot legally
3
provide. The question is, does a Minnesota city have the authority
4
under state law to mandate that contracting employers provide
1. David Hawley, Minneapolis Approves Domestic Partner Provision, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 14, 2002, at 5B, available at 2002 WL 104725048.
2. See Rochelle Olson, Minneapolis City Council; Rule on Domestic Partner
Benefits OK’d; Many Firms That Have Contracts with the City of Minneapolis Will Have to
Comply, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 14, 2002, at 2B, available at 2002 WL
5388600.
3. Id.
4. Although intriguing federal issues are raised by the Minneapolis domestic
partner-city contractor ordinance, this comment does not address them. For the
purposes of this comment, it suffices to observe that the ordinance raises issues as
to whether it is preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., or violates the dormant Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Both issues have been
litigated extensively in California. See S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. San Francisco, 336 F.3d
1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding San Francisco’s domestic partner-city
contractor ordinance on the grounds that it does not conflict with the state’s
domestic partner benefits registration statute); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. San
Francisco, 266 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2001); S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. San Francisco, 253
F.3d 461, 470-71, 474 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding San Francisco’s domestic partnercity contractor ordinance did not directly violate the Commerce Clause and did
not violate the California Constitution); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. San Francisco,
992 F. Supp. 1149, 1165, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding San Francisco’s domesticpartner-city contractor ordinance did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause
“as an excessive burden on interstate commerce[,]” but is preempted by ERISA to
the extent its mandated benefits are “covered by ERISA and provided through
ERISA plans”).
Numerous commentaries have already been offered on these subjects as
well. See generally Jeffrey A. Brauch, Municipal Activism v. Federal Law: Why ERISA
Preempts San Francisco-Style Domestic Partner Ordinances, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 925
(1998); William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review
and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961 (2001); Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of
State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in
Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 267 (1998); Todd Foreman, Comment,
Nondiscrimination Ordinance 101 San Francisco’s Nondiscrimination in City Contracts
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5

domestic partner benefits?
Part II of this comment traces the recent evolution in
6
municipal domestic partner benefits legislation nationwide. After
comparing the various domestic partner-contractor ordinances in
7
San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Minneapolis, Part III
surveys the history and status of “home rule” authority with a focus
8
on Minnesota law. Parts IV, V, and VI then analyze whether
Minneapolis’ recent domestic partner benefits scheme is consistent
9
with Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, in which the court held that
Minneapolis exceeded its “home rule” authority by providing
10
domestic partners benefits to city employees. Part VI also ponders
11
whether Lilly was properly decided. Part VII explores new state
12
issues raised by Minneapolis’ domestic partner ordinance. This
comment concludes that Lilly employed the correct interpretation
of “home rule” authority in Minnesota and the decision renders
13
Minneapolis’ domestic partner benefits law invalid.

and Benefits Ordinance: A New Approach to Winning Domestic Partnership Benefits, 2 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 319 (1999); Emily V. Griffen, Comment, “Relations Stop
Nowhere”: ERISA Preemption of San Francisco’s Domestic Partner Ordinance, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 459 (2001); Richard W. Helms, Note, Air Transport Association of America v. City
and County of San Francisco: Domestic Partner Benefits Upheld, Except Where Preempted by
ERISA, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 323 (1999-2000); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic
Partnership and ERISA Preemption, 76 TUL. L. REV. 373 (2001); Mark A. Tumeo, Civil
Rights for Gays and Lesbians and Domestic Partner Benefits: How Far Could an Ohio
Municipality Go?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165 (2002-03); Alex Turner, The Denial of
Benefits to the Same-sex Domestic Partners of State Employees: How Do Claims of
Discrimination Fare Outside the Shadow of ERISA Preemption?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
669 (2002). This is not to imply these federal issues are settled, however.
5. The question of the legality of city ordinances requiring contractors to
provide benefits to unmarried domestic partners is “on the cutting edge of law and
has a number of sub-parts. The answers are only partially in view at this time
because there has been little litigation on the issue.” Jordan Lorence, Corporate
Resource Council, Answers to an Employer’s Legal Questions About Domestic Partner
Benefits and Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination Policies, at 2, available at
http://www.corporateresourcecouncil.org/white_papers/Legal_Questions.pdf
(last visited March 6, 2004).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part III.
9. 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
10. Id. at 113; see infra Parts IV-VI.B.
11. See infra Part VI.C.
12. See infra Part VII.
13. See infra Part VIII.
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II. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF
MUNICIPAL DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS LEGISLATION
A. History of Domestic Partner Benefits Legislation in the United
States
Minneapolis has been at the forefront of the movement to
14
recognize domestic partners since 1991. Minneapolis was neither
the first nor the only city to enact domestic partner ordinances,
15
however.
Thus it is helpful to understand the meaning and
origins of the term “domestic partner” in order to understand the
goals and context of Minneapolis’ domestic partner benefits
legislation.
The term “domestic partner” is a fairly recent innovation in
16
the English language, going back only about twenty years. The
meaning of the term is less clear than its origins, however. The
definition of “domestic partner” remains “an empty vessel that
17
legislatures or employers may fill as they wish.”
If a generally
accepted definition of a “domestic partner” does exist, it is
someone who lives together with another partner, is at least
eighteen years old, is not married, is jointly responsible for
expenses, is not a close relative, and is competent to consent to the
18
arrangement. Although “domestic partner” is often coterminous
with same-sex partner, a vast majority of jurisdictions define a
“domestic partner” as someone of either the same or opposite sex
19
as the other partner.
Domestic partner benefits legislation soon followed the

14. See Steve Brandt, City to Recognize Incoming Domestic Partners, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., Sept. 5, 2003, at 2B, available at 2003 WL 5543173. “Minneapolis was
the second large city in the nation [after San Francisco] to allow domestic partners
to register when it adopted its law in 1991.” Id. Minneapolis is also among the
first large cities to recognize domestic partners registered in other cities. Id. The
city currently has three homosexuals on its city council. Id. This is not to imply
that the issue of domestic partner benefits only impacts homosexuals, however.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See Sherman, supra note 4, at 382-83. The New York Times did not use the
term “domestic partner” until 1982. Id. at 382.
17. Id. at 383. Contrast “domestic partner” with the term “widow,” which has
a meaning that all states presumably agree upon. Id. This definitional ambiguity
may be the result of the fairly recent introduction of the term. See id. at 383-83.
18. Duncan, supra note 4, at 969-72.
19. Id. at 972.
Montgomery County, Maryland and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania are two jurisdictions that “allow only same-sex couples to register.”
Id.
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development of the term.
Berkeley, California birthed the
20
municipal domestic partner benefit in 1984. A number of cities in
recent years have since enacted ordinances providing employment
21
benefits to domestic partners of city employees.
As many as
seventy-four cities and counties currently offer their employees or
22
residents domestic partner benefits.
Some of these measures
provide domestic partner benefits only to same-sex partners of
employees, while others encompass both same and opposite-sex
23
partners.
Minneapolis joined the fray by enacting its first
domestic partner ordinance providing benefits to city employees in
24
25
1991, though this legislation was later struck down.
B. “A Tale of Four Cities”: Domestic Partner Legislation Affecting City
Contractors
While legislation providing benefits to city employees’
26
domestic partners has become more common, some cities have
not stopped at providing such benefits to their own employees.
Recently, four large cities have gone a step further by enacting
ordinances mandating that city contractors, rather than city
governments, provide domestic partner benefits to their own
27
28
29
employees.
These cities are San Francisco, Los Angeles,
30
31
Seattle, and (most recently) Minneapolis. Rather than provide
20. Id. at 965.
21. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity of Governmental Domestic
Partnership Enactment, 74 A.L.R.5th 439, § 2 (1999).
22. Duncan, supra note 4, at 965.
23. Miller, supra note 21, at § 2.
24. Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 539, 539 (1991); see also Kate Latimer, Domestic Partners and Discrimination:
The Need for Fair Employment Compensation, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 329, 329
(1992).
25. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
26. See Duncan, supra note 4, at 964-65.
27. See Dean Scott, Companies Take Lead in Extending Benefits to Unmarried
Partners, KIPLINGER BUSINESS FORECASTS, July 17, 2003, available at 2003 WL
10080583.
28. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.1-6 (2002), available at
http://www.sfgov.org/site/government_index.asp#codes (last visited March 6,
2004).
29. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, art. 1, § 10.8.1-2 (2002), available at
http://lacodes.lacity.org/NXT/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm
(last
visited March 6, 2004).
30. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010-050 (2002),
available at http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/council/legdb.htm (last visited March 6,
2004).
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benefits to city employees, these cities require contractors who bid
on city contracts to offer domestic partner benefits to their
32
workers. San Francisco was the first city to enact such legislation,
33
which took effect in 1997. Seattle and Los Angeles soon followed
34
suit with their own ordinances. As was the case with domestic
partner benefits legislation aimed at city employees, Minneapolis
followed San Francisco’s lead with its own city contractor ordinance
35
as well.
1. Similarities among City Contractor Ordinances
The four cities’ ordinances share many basic similarities. The
crux of each ordinance is that city contractors must offer the same
benefits to their workers’ domestic partners as they do to workers’
36
spouses. Each city includes in its definition of domestic partner
persons registered as domestic partners with the city, and none of
37
the statutes limits the definition to same-sex couples. Exceptions
to compliance are provided in each ordinance, which are generally
given at the discretion of the city under certain limited
38
conditions.
Under these exceptions, a city contractor may be
granted an exception to compliance if the city faces an
39
emergency, the contractor is the only provider of services the city
31. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200 (2003),
available at http://livepublish.municode.com/13/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=mainj.htm (last visited March 6, 2004).
32. Scott, supra note 27.
33. See Sherman, supra note 4, at 378-79.
34. See id. at 378, n.13 (citing J. Martin McOmber, Benefits for Gay Couples
Approved by City Council, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at B3, available at 1999 WL
6300935; Rick Orlov, Domestic Partner Benefits at Issue; City Panel Wants Contractors
Forced to Offer Care, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17, 1999, at N3, available at 1999 WL
7031585).
35. See MINNEAPOLIS CODE tit. 2, ch. 18 (2003).
36. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2 (2002); MINNEAPOLIS,
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d) (2003); S.F., CAL., ADMIN.
CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.1(b) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, §
20.45.020A 2002).
37. See L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(b)(8) (2002);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) (2003); S.F.,
CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.1(c) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20,
ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010.E (2002).
38. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(i) (2002); MINNEAPOLIS,
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g) (2003); S.F., CAL., ADMIN.
CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, §
20.45.020.C (2002).
39. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(i)(1)(c) (2002);
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41

requires, or the contractor is a public entity.
Each city, save
Seattle, also allows exceptions to contractor compliance if the
42
exceptions are in the perceived best interest of the city. All four
cities include provisions indicating that the ordinances are to be
43
interpreted consistently with federal and state law. Finally, each
44
ordinance is severable in the event that any parts are modified or
45
stricken in court.
2. Differences among City Contractor Ordinances
Despite sharing many similarities, the four cities’ ordinances
contain a few noteworthy differences. Whereas Minneapolis and
San Francisco require compliance by subcontractors as well as
46
contractors, Los Angeles and Seattle do not.
While no city
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g)(1) (2003);
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1(a)(2) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN.
CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.020.C.1 (2002).
40. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, §§ 10.8.2.l(i)(1)(a), (g) (2002);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g)(2)(c)-(e)
(2003); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1(a)(1) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.020.C.2 (2002).
41. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(i)(1)(e) (2002);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, §§18.200(f)(5),(8) (2003);
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1(b) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.020.C.4-5 (2002).
42. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(i)(1)(h) (2002);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g)(2)(f) (2003)
(using the term “substantial cost savings” instead of “best interest”); S.F., CAL.,
ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1(a)(3) (2002).
43. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(j) (2003); MINNEAPOLIS,
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) (2003) (noting under the
definition of “employee benefits” that such benefits shall be provided “unless
otherwise prohibited by state, federal[,] or other law”); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch.
12B, § 12B.6 (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010.F
(2002) (noting under the definition of “employee benefits” that “it does not
include benefits to the extent that . . . such benefits may be preempted by federal
or state law”).
44. A “severability clause” is “[a] provision that keeps the remaining
provisions of a contract or statute in force if any portion of that contract or statute
is judicially declared void or unconstitutional.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (7th
ed. 1999).
45. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(k) (2002); MINNEAPOLIS,
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1.20 (2003); S.F., CAL.,
ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.6 (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch.
20.45, tit. 1, ch. 1.04, § 1.04.010 (2002).
46. Compare MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, §§
18.200(c), (k) (2003) (requiring all subcontractors to comply if they meet the
minimum contract amount and employee number requirements) and S.F., CAL.,
ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, §§ 12B.1(c), 12B.2 (2002) (requiring subcontractors to
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requires the provision of domestic partner benefits by contractors
whose contracts are of marginal monetary value, the cities
substantially differ on how large the city contract must be to trigger
47
their domestic partner benefit requirement.
Minneapolis’
ordinance is somewhat more limited than other cities in that its
ordinance applies only to contractors that employ twenty-one or
48
more employees. The cities differ as to whether the contracting
entity must provide benefits to all its employees or only those whose
49
work involves the city contract. The benefits city contractors must
offer domestic partners differ slightly, with Seattle requiring the
provision of the most comprehensive list of benefits, and
50
Minneapolis requiring the least. Finally, each city except Seattle
comply if their work comprises ten percent or more of any subcontract), with L.A.,
CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2(b)(12) (2002) (not requiring
subcontractors to comply “unless they have another contract directly with the
City”) and SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.030 (2002) (“[t]he
requirements of this chapter shall not apply to . . . subcontractors”).
47. See L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.1 (2002) (defining
“contract” as any agreement with the city, large or small); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) (2003) (requiring that contractors
provide domestic partner benefits only if the value of the city contract exceeds
$100,000); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.1(c) (2002) (limiting “contract”
to only those agreements that cumulatively exceed $5,000 per year); SEATTLE,
WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010.A (2002) (applying the ordinance
only to contractors whose contract with the city is valued at $33,000 or more).
48. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c)
(2003).
49. Compare L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(e)(2) (2002)
(requiring the contractor offer benefits only to the employees whose work is
related to the city contract) and SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, §
20.45.030 (requiring the same as L.A.), with MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF
ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, §§ 18.200(c), 18.200(f)(1) (2003) (requiring city
contractors to allow “every employee” to be eligible for benefits) and S.F., CAL.,
ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.1(d) (2002) (mandating that city contractors provide
benefits to all their employees regardless of whether all the employees are
engaged in work related to the city contract).
50. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(b)(2) (2002) (including
bereavement leave, family medical leave, health benefits, membership discounts,
moving expenses, pension and retirement benefits, and travel benefits);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) (2002)
(including bereavement leave, disability insurance, life insurance, health benefits,
dental benefits, family leave, memberships, moving expenses, and travel benefits);
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.1(b) (2002) (including bereavement leave,
family medical leave, health benefits, membership or membership discounts,
moving expenses, pension and retirement benefits, and travel benefits); SEATTLE,
WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.020F (2002) (including bereavement
leave; disability, life, other types of insurance; family medical leave; health benefits;
membership or membership discounts; moving expenses; pensions and retirement
benefits; vacation; and travel benefits). Seattle defines benefits in the broadest
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mandates contractor compliance only for the duration of the city
51
contract.
C. The Impact of Municipal Domestic Partner Legislation
The recent expansion of domestic partner benefits legislation
is illustrative of the general trend among large cities to enact social
52
policies intended to reach well beyond their own borders. San
Francisco has a “Burma” ordinance prohibiting companies that
have employees in Burma or hold an interest in Burmese
53
corporations from contracting with the city.
For its part,
Minneapolis has attempted to “address social issues ranging from
54
organic food to the country of Myanmar.”
The results of municipal domestic partner benefits legislation
have been far-reaching. Approximately 5700 employers nationwide
55
offer health insurance benefits to same-sex domestic partners.
Most companies that offer domestic partner benefits to their
employees ostensibly do so in connection with city ordinances
56
requiring domestic partner benefits. As of October 2001, more
than seventy percent of companies across the nation that provide
domestic partner benefits have contracted with San Francisco, Los
57
Angeles, or Seattle. While subsequent litigation has narrowed the
terms, requiring also that contractors provide domestic partners with “any other
benefits given to employees [consistent with federal and state law].” Id.
Minneapolis mandates the narrowest range of benefits by excluding retirement
and pension benefits altogether. See MINNEAPOLIS CODE § 18.200(c).
51. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, §§ 10.8.2, 10.8.2(c)(3) (2002);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(f)(3) (2003); S.F.,
CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.2 (2002) (“In the performance of a
contract . . .”). Seattle makes no mention of the limitation that the benefits
provided be during the duration of the contract with the city. See SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010-050 (2002).
52. See Brauch, supra note 4, at 929.
53. Allen Samuelson, Doing Business with the Sovereign: Unique Terms and
Disputes in Public Agency IT Contracts, 700 PLI/PAT 91, 111 (2002) (referring to S.F.,
CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12J, § 12J.1 (2002)).
54. Olson, supra note 2.
55. See Access Domestic Partners: More Employers Offer Health Benefits, Study, 10 AM.
POL. NETWORK-AM. HEALTH LINE No. 9 (May 19, 2003).
56. Glen E. Lavy, Corporate Resource Council Manual, Behind the Rhetoric: The
Social Goals of GLBT Advocacy in Corporate America, at 5, available at
http://www.corporateresourcecouncil.org/white_papers/Behind_The_Rhetoric.p
df (citing Human Rights Campaign (HRC), The State of the Workplace 2001, at 18-19
(fig. 6), available at www.hrc.org/worknet/publications/state_workplace/2001/
sow2001.pdf) (last visited Dec. 28, 2003)).
57. See id.
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58

breadth of some of these ordinances, companies have been forced
to act with the understanding that unless they provide benefits to
their employees’ domestic partners anywhere they do business, they
59
will lose their contract(s) with these cities.
For its part,
Minneapolis’ ordinance has the potential to affect 150 contractor60
employers per year.
In a very real sense, San Francisco, Los
Angeles, and Seattle are dictating employment policy beyond their
61
The question is, is it within Minneapolis’ legal
own borders.
discretion to join these cities?
III. “HOME RULE” AUTHORITY
A. Definition and Significance
The ramifications of domestic partner ordinances have not
gone unnoticed. Since the movement to recognize domestic
partnerships began, measures requiring municipalities to provide
domestic partner benefits to employees frequently have been
62
Challenges to local domestic partnership
challenged in court.
laws usually encompass the argument that such measures go
63
beyond the “home rule” authority.
“Home rule” authority is defined generally as the discretion
64
given to municipalities by the state to manage municipal affairs.
More specifically, “home rule” authority is “the ability of a local
58. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
59. See Brauch, supra note 4, at 929.
60. See Olson, supra note 2. In 2002, Minneapolis “took 150 bids and
proposals for contracts worth more than $100,000.” Id.
61. See HRC, supra note 56, at 18-19.
62. See Miller, supra note 21, at § 2.
63. Id. A list of cases ruling on domestic partner benefits follows: Irizarry v.
Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001); Schaefer v. City & County of
Denver, 973 P.2d 717 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); Martin v. City of Gainesville, 800 So.
2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000); City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. 1997); City of
Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995); Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710
N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Tyma v. Montgomery County, 801 A.2d 148 (Md.
2002); Connors v. City of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999); Opinions of the
Justices to the House of Representatives, 696 N.E.2d 502 (Mass. 1998); Lilly v. City
of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29,
1995); Slattery v. City of New York, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999), appeal
transferred, 711 N.E.2d 640 (N.Y. Apr. 1, 1999); Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 809
A.2d 980 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va.
2000); Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709 (Wash. 2001).
64. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions § 108 (2003).
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government to act and make policy in all areas that have not been
65
designated to be of statewide interest through general law.” In
spite of its name, “home rule” authority “admits to the possibility
that state government actions may severely limit local autonomy
66
and discretion.” “Home rule” authority can be granted by either
67
statute or state constitution. “Under home-rule [constitutional]
amendments, cities no longer are dependent upon the state
legislature for their authority to determine their local affairs and
68
government . . . .”
“Although home-rule power generally is
subject to some limitation by constitutional provision or legislation,
the extent of limitations on home-rule powers varies from state to
69
state.”
B. Diversity among State “Home Rule” Authority Laws
The breadth of a state’s “home rule” authority laws may
determine the fate of a particular jurisdiction’s domestic partner
70
Further, courts’ analysis of whether local
benefits legislation.
ordinances are consistent with state law is an important factor in
71
deciding whether such laws will survive court challenges. Some
jurisdictions “have construed the preemptive effect of state civil
rights legislation narrowly[] to leave ample room for locally
initiated measures,” whereas others have “adopted an expansive
view of state preemption,” leaving such measures ripe to be struck
72
down. Largely as a consequence of different state interpretations
of “home rule” authority, some domestic partner benefits
ordinances have survived court challenges, while others have been
struck down on the grounds that they conflict with, or are
73
preempted by, state law. Atlanta appears to be the only city that
65. Dale Krane et al., Introduction to HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE
HANDBOOK 2 (Dale Krane et al. eds., CQ Press 2001).
66. Id.
67. See 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions § 110 (2000).
68. Id. § 108.
69. Id., § 110.
70. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2357
(2003).
71. See Miller, supra note 21, at § 2.
72. Barron, supra note 70, at 2357.
73. See id. The following cases have upheld domestic partner ordinances:
Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a Chicago Board of Education policy extending health benefits to same-sex
domestic partners did not violate the equal protection rights of employees who
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has successfully defended domestic partner benefits legislation in
74
state court after having its initial ordinance struck down.
While San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Minneapolis
have substantially similar domestic partner benefits ordinances
75
requiring city contractors to provide benefits to their employees,
the “home rule” authority laws vary among their respective states.
cohabited with opposite-sex couples); Schaefer v. City & County of Denver, 973
P.2d 717 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a city ordinance extending health
benefits to domestic partners of city employees did not exceed home rule
authority granted by the state); Martin v. City of Gainesville, 800 So. 2d 687 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (denying a challenge to domestic partner ordinance on the
grounds that plaintiff taxpayer lacked the requisite standing under state law to
bring suit); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding a county did not intrude on a matter reserved for the state alone in
providing domestic partner benefits); City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193
(Ga. 1997) (holding that a city ordinance was within the city’s home rule
authority to enact because it did not use any language recognizing new family
relationships similar to marriage); Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999) (holding a city domestic partner ordinance was a permissible
exercise under the state’s home rule authority); Tyma v. Montgomery County, 714
N.E.2d 335 (Md. 2002) (same); Opinions of the Justices to the House of
Representatives, 696 N.E.2d 502 (Mass. 1998) (advising state legislature that a bill
authorizing cities to offer domestic partner benefits to their employees’ partners
did not constitute an unlawful delegation of authority); Slattery v. City of New
York, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (dismissing taxpayer’s action
challenging city domestic partner ordinance that extended health and retirement
benefits); Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709 (Wash. 2001) (holding that a
“home rule” city could enact domestic partner benefits legislation).
The cases that struck down domestic partner benefits ordinances include:
City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995) (holding a city ordinance
that recognizes domestic partners as family relationships as well as providing
benefits to domestic partners exceeds home rule authority); Connors v. City of
Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999) (striking down a domestic partner benefits
order because the city’s mayor exceeded his authority in issuing the executive
order); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1995) (holding that a city domestic partner ordinance
conflicted with state law and was an exercise beyond the city’s “home rule”
authority); Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 809 A.2d 980 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)
(holding that a city domestic partner ordinance created a new form of marital
relationship in violation of state public policy); Arlington County v. White, 528
S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2000) (holding that a county attempt to provide insurance
coverage for employees’ unmarried domestic partners is ultra vires).
74. Compare McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (striking down a city domestic partner
benefits ordinance), with Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193 (upholding the same city’s
revised version of a domestic partner ordinance). The Morgan court upheld
Atlanta’s revised domestic partner benefits ordinance on the grounds that the city
“carefully avoided the constitutional flaw in its previous benefits ordinance by
eliminating . . . [from its] definition of ‘dependent’ any language recognizing any
new family relationship similar to marriage.” Morgan, 492 S.E.2d at 195.
75. See supra Part II.B.1.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/4

12

Bayse: Pulling the Lilly from the Pond? Minneapolis Wades into Domestic
BAYSE - FINAL.DOC

2004]

3/30/2004 10:01 PM

PULLING THE LILLY FROM THE POND?

943

This variance in part explains why Minneapolis’ city employee76
domestic partner benefits legislation was struck down in court
while similar domestic partner benefits legislation was upheld in
77
78
79
California and Washington.
In contrast to Minnesota,
80
California grants expansive “home rule” powers. California gives
power permissively to its local governments, leaving them “subject
to few limitations other than to abstain from running deficit
81
spending.”
In Washington, “the parameters within which local
82
governments can exercise home rule powers are quite limited.”
The fact that Washington courts upheld domestic partner benefits
legislation is an anomaly given the state’s stringent interpretation
83
of “home rule” authority generally. In any event, the different
outcomes of prior domestic partner benefits legislation helps
illustrate the importance of focusing on a particular state’s
interpretation of “home rule” authority in determining whether
such legislation will survive a court challenge.

76. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 107.
77. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 336 F.3d 1174 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the San Francisco ordinance is neither duplicative nor
contradictory to state law, and is not an exercise beyond the city’s authority); S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding the San Francisco ordinance is valid because a city may regulate outside
its geographic bounds so long as its actions are an exercise of the city’s proprietary
contracting power).
78. See Heinsma, 29 P.3d at 713 (holding that a home-rule city could enact
domestic partner benefits legislation).
79. See infra Part III.C.
80. See Michael A. Woods, The Propriety of Local Government Protections of Gays
and Lesbians from Discriminatory Employment Practices, 52 EMORY L.J. 515, 532 (2003).
81. Id. “In California . . . localities trace the source of their power to two key
state constitutional sections. The first provides that ‘[a] county or city may make
and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and
regulations not in conflict with general laws.’ ” Id. at 531-32 (quoting CAL. CONST.
art. XI, § 7). “The second permits a city or county to adopt and amend its charter
‘[f]or its own government,’ by a majority vote of those citizens entitled to vote.”
Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. X., § 3(a)). “California courts have broadly construed
the constitutional grant of local power over ‘municipal affairs . . . .’ ” Id. (citing
Alvin D. Sokolow & Peter M. Detwiler, California, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra
note 65, at 58). Municipalities in California have thus had “considerable
discretion in the crafting of social policy.” Id.
82. Meredith A. Newman & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Washington, in HOME RULE IN
AMERICA, supra note 65, at 437.
83. See generally Heinsma, 29 P.3d 709. The court, while noting that
Washington had statutes in place favoring heterosexual marriage, concluded that
the legislature did not define “dependents” to exclude domestic partners, and
therefore upheld the municipal ordinance. Id. at 712.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 4
BAYSE - FINAL.DOC

944

3/30/2004 10:01 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

C. “Home Rule” Authority in Minnesota
Minnesota, though far from stingy in allowing for local
autonomy, exercises more oversight over localities than California
but less than Washington. Historically, the Minnesota Legislature
84
was slow to embrace a process for localities to obtain “home rule.”
After originally rejecting legislation authorizing “home rule” in
1895, the Minnesota Legislature passed legislation authorizing
85
cities to adopt “home rule” charters in 1896. This legislation did
not extend to municipalities such as towns, villages, and other local
86
governments until 1987, however.
Since then, the Minnesota
Constitution has permitted local government units to obtain and
87
adopt their own “home rule” charters.
“Home rule” status in Minnesota does not necessarily mean
88
more autonomy for localities.
Despite the formal legal
designation of “home rule” for some Minnesota cities, the
“operational differences evident [in such cities’] powers and
89
functions” are not always apparent. Minnesota courts have long
sought to oversee city actions to enforce the boundaries of “home
90
rule” authority.
In so doing, Minnesota courts often recite
91
something akin to Dillon’s Rule, which reflects the long-standing
92
notion that municipal power is wholly derived from the state.
84. See Philip H. Wichern, Minnesota, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 65,
at 225.
85. Id.
86. Id. For a more complete history of the limits of “home rule” in
Minnesota, see generally id.; Note, Municipal Civil Rights Legislation—Is the Power
Conferred by the Grant of Home Rule?, 53 MINN. L. REV. 342 (1968); Terrance
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48
MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964).
87. See MINN. CONST. art. 12, § 4, which states, in pertinent part: “Any local
government unit when authorized by law may adopt a home rule charter for its
government.”
88. See Wichern, supra note 84, at 225.
89. Id.
90. See id. (citing Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S 365
(1926); State v. Clarke Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 238 Minn. 192, 56 N.W.2d 667
(1952); State v. Houston, 210 Minn. 379, 298 N.W. 358 (1941)).
91. Dillon’s Rule states that “[m]unicipal corporations owe their origin to,
and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature.” City of Clinton v.
Cedar Rapids & M.R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868). Although the “modern
trend has been toward a broad grant of authority to municipalities and other local
government bodies,” Dillon’s Rule remains influential and persists to this day.
Woods, supra note 80, at 521.
92. See Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 1984) (stating
“[a] municipality has no inherent powers, but only such powers as are expressly
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Courts have stated that Minnesota cities have “wide discretion in
93
Despite this
dealing with matters of local importance.”
proclamation, “[t]he distinction between statewide and local
94
concern has a rich and confused history in local government law.”
The “external effects of local activity have typically been at the core
of the inquiry [into whether an ordinance is of local or statewide
95
concern].”
The “home rule” authority test applied by Minnesota courts
states that a municipal regulation may be invalid if it either
96
expressly or impliedly conflicts with a state statute, or if it
97
legislates in a realm occupied by the state. Minnesota courts have
conferred by statute or are implied as necessary in aid of those powers which are
expressly conferred.) (citing Minnetonka Elect. Co. v. Vill. of Golden Valley, 273
Minn. 301, 141 N.W.2d 138 (1966); Vill. of Brooklyn Ctr. v. Rippen, 255 Minn.
334, 96 N.W.2d 585 (1959)); Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 267 Minn.
221, 225, 125 N.W.2d 846, 849 (1964) (indicating “[t]he city’s right to act . . . as
always, is dependent upon a grant from the state”); Mangold Midwest Co. v. Vill. of
Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 357, 143 N.W.2d 813, 820 (1966) (stating “municipalities
have no inherent powers . . . .”).
93. Arcadia, 267 Minn. at 225, 125 N.W.2d at 850 (citing City of Duluth v.
Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779 (1944)).
94. Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83
VA. L. REV. 1347, 1400 (1997) (discussing the statewide concern issue in reference
to the Lilly decision).
95. Id.
96. See Mangold, 274 Minn. at 352, 143 N.W.2d at 816 (ruling that conflict
exists between a local ordinance and state statute when “both the ordinance and
the statute contain express or implied terms that are irreconcilable with each
other”). Express conflict between an ordinance and statute occurs when a statute
“specifies withdrawal, limitation, or restriction of [the] municipal power [at
issue],” or limits the “methods of procedure open to municipalities [so as to
render the ordinance invalid].” George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State
Restraint upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 22 STETSON L. REV. 643,
647 (1993). Implied conflict exists when “the [state] legislature intends to deny
that power [a municipality is trying to exercise] which [the legislature] does not
expressly grant.” Id.
97. See Vaubel, supra note 96, at 647; see also Mangold, 274 Minn. at 356, 143
N.W.2d at 819 (noting “it is our opinion that preemption and conflict are separate
concepts and should be governed by separate doctrines.”). The court likened
preemption to the “occupation of the field” concept familiar in federalism
disputes between states and the federal government. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court
has summarized the concept as follows:
[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted
where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal
Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from
a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it,” or where an Act of Congress “touch[es] a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
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not hesitated to use state powers when localities tread on issues that
98
reach beyond their borders. Despite the limited nature of “home
rule” in Minnesota, it is noteworthy that as a general rule
“[c]ontracting, purchasing, and bidding procedures are primarily
99
within the powers of local governments.” Even this discretion is
100
limited, however, “by state requirements.”
As ambiguous or confusing as Minnesota’s “home rule”
authority may seem, it may simply be described as an attempt to
allow localities to address matters of concern to them while
preserving for the state the sole prerogative of addressing matters
of concern to the entire state.
IV. THE LILLY DECISION
The City of Minneapolis’ (the City) recent attempt to mandate
domestic partner benefits is part of an ongoing effort by the city to
101
expand domestic partner benefits. The Minneapolis City Council
attempted to legislate in the area of domestic partner benefits on
102
January 25, 1991.
Under the Domestic Partner Ordinance
103
and city resolutions 93R-106 and 93R-342, domestic
(DPO)
partners of city employees were entitled to receive the same health
benefits that legal spouses would otherwise have received from the
city, unless the domestic partner already had access to other health
104
insurance coverage.
The DPO defined domestic partners as two
adults who are not related, unmarried, have no other domestic
partner, are “jointly responsible to each other for the necessities of
life,” and “are committed to one another to the same extent as
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
98. See, e.g., Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 122-24 (Minn. 1984)
(ruling a municipality is without jurisdiction to regulate dredging public waters
because the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has exclusive
jurisdiction over such matters); Arcadia, 267 Minn. at 224, 228, 125 N.W.2d at 849,
852 (concluding city council’s action to deny permit for corporation to display its
business sign on its property exceeded the bounds of city authority); Nordmarken
v. City of Richfield, 641 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that state
law preempts a home rule city from using the referendum process to approve or
disapprove municipal land use and development laws).
99. Wichern, supra note 84, at 227.
100. Id.
101. See supra Parts II.A-B and accompanying text.
102. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
103. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 142 (1991).
104. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 109.
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105

married persons are to each other.”
Soon after the DPO passed, a Minneapolis resident and
taxpayer, James A. Lilly (Lilly), sought to enjoin the City from
106
disbursing benefits to domestic partners.
Lilly argued that the
City’s “health care coverage for same sex domestic partners
107
contravened state public policy and violated state law.” Both the
108
109
district court and court of appeals ruled in favor of Lilly.
The court of appeals based its decision on the limitations of
110
Minnesota’s “home rule” authority.
In so doing, the court
emphatically rejected the City’s claim that “its action is of a local
111
concern only and does not conflict with state law.” Although the
“home rule” authority Minnesota grants to its cities is not
restrictive, it is only as broad as the state constitution and state
112
statutes allow. According to the court:
A municipality has no inherent powers, but only such
powers as are expressly conferred by statute or are implied
as necessary in aid of those powers which are expressly
conferred. . . . [I]f a matter presents a statewide problem, the
implied necessary powers of a municipality to regulate are
narrowly construed unless the legislature has expressly provided
113
otherwise.
The court affirmed the district court’s determination that the
provision of insurance coverage for municipal employees and their
114
Moreover, the
dependents is a matter of statewide concern.
court determined that the matter of domestic partner benefits

105. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 142, § 142.20 (1991).
106. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 109.
107. Id.
108. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at *4
(Minn. Dist. Ct. June 3, 1994).
109. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 108.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 111.
112. Lilly, 1994 WL 315620, at *2 (conclusion of law no. 5) (citing MINN.
CONST. art. 12, § 4; MINN. STAT. §§ 410.04, 410.03, & 410.07 (1993); State ex rel.
Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526, 91 N.W.2d 81 (1958); Park v.
City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 298, 59 N.W. 627, 628 (1916); Am. Elec. Co. v. City
of Waseca, 102 Minn. 329, 330, 333-34, 113 N.W.2d 899 (1907); City of
Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights v. Univ. of Minn., 356 N.W.2d 841, 843
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn.
1984))).
113. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 111 (quoting Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d
117, 120 (Minn. 1984)).
114. Id.
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115

concerns “the statewide problem of discrimination.”
The court
ruled that “the definition of family relationships and dependent
116
status, are statewide concerns.” The court therefore concluded
that the City’s authority to combat discrimination must be narrowly
117
construed.
The court rejected the City’s argument that in providing
domestic partner benefits to its employees it was merely applying
118
the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination
119
on the basis of sexual orientation.
The court noted clear
legislative intent to eliminate discrimination but to not endorse
homosexual lifestyles or provide additional benefits to domestic
120
partners,
citing Minnesota’s anti-discrimination statute
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which
in pertinent part provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to . . . mean that the state of Minnesota condones
homosexuality or bisexuality or any equivalent lifestyle [or to]
authorize the recognition of marriage between persons of the same
121
sex.”
Also cited were comments in the Senate during debate to
amend Minnesota’s Human Rights Act indicating “there is nothing
in [the Act] about [ ] domestic partners benefits. Nothing that
122
could lead to it.”
The court concluded that the DPO, narrowly construed,
123
Under
conflicted with Minnesota’s municipal benefits statute.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 113.
117. Id.
118. MINN. STAT. §§ 363-363.15 (1992).
119. MINN. STAT. § 363.10 (1992).
120. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 112 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (1993);
Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory Practices on the Basis of Sexual or Affectional
Orientation: Hearing on S.F. 444, 1993 Leg., 78th Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Allen Spear)).
121. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 112 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (1993)).
122. Id. (quoting Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Sen. Allen Spear)).
123. Id. at 113 (referring to MINN. STAT. § 471.61 (1992)). Minnesota’s
municipal benefits statute, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
A . . . municipal corporation, . . . other political subdivision or other
body corporate and politic of this state . . . may insure or protect its or
their officers and employees, and their dependents, or any class or
classes of officers, employees, or dependents, under a policy or policies
or contract or contracts of group insurance or benefits covering . . .
medical and surgical benefits and hospitalization insurance or benefits
for both employees and dependents . . . . A payment is deemed to be
additional compensation paid to the officers or employees.
MINN. STAT. § 471.61, subd. 1 (2002).
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the court’s reasoning, the statute specifically defined “dependents”
124
The Lilly
to the exclusion of unmarried domestic partners.
decision sent a clear message to Minnesota cities considering
enactment of domestic partnership measures: leave it to the state to
125
legislate in the area of domestic partner benefits.
V. MINNEAPOLIS’ DOMESTIC PARTNER ORDINANCE
126
AIMED AT CITY CONTRACTORS
Despite the clear message of Lilly, Minneapolis recently
127
reentered the realm of domestic partner benefits legislation.
This time, Minneapolis passed an ordinance targeted at city
128
contractors rather than the city itself.
A. Purpose
Minneapolis has framed the debate over domestic partners as
129
one of social justice and economic efficiency. The stated purpose
of Minneapolis’ city contractor ordinance is to recognize that “a
nationwide debate has advanced an expanded concept of familial
130
relationships beyond traditional, marital relationships.”
According to the City, “this expanded concept includes
relationships between two (2) non-married, adult partners who are
committed to one another to the same extent as married persons
131
are to each other.”
In requiring city contractors to provide
domestic partner benefits, the City claims that “the quality of goods
132
and services that city receives” will improve.
The ordinance
nowhere states, however, that the City will receive equivalent goods
133
or services at the same or lower cost.

124. The court noted that the legislature had twice amended the statute to
define dependents, once to include “spouse and minor unmarried children” and
once to include “dependent students under the age of 25.” Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at
111. Nowhere did the definition include non-marital relationships, however. See
id.
125. See id.
126. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200 (2003).
127. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
128. See id.
129. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a)
(2003).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
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B. Scope
The ordinance at first glance appears to be broader in scope
than it actually is. The ordinance states:
No contractor shall discriminate by policy or practice in
the provision of employee benefits between an employee
with a domestic partner and an employee with a spouse.
Any employee benefit provided in any manner contingent
upon the existence of a marital relationship must also be
134
provided to an employee who has a domestic partner.
The definitions used in the statute narrow the ordinance’s
135
scope. A “contractor” is an employer who “maintains 21 or more
employees on the payroll during 20 or more calendar
136
workweeks.”
“Contract” is limited to deals with the city in which
137
“Employee benefits”
the estimated total value exceeds $100,000.
include “bereavement leave, disability insurance, life insurance,
health benefits, dental benefits, family leave, memberships, moving
138
expenses, and travel benefits.”
“Domestic partners” are any two
partners, including same-sex couples, who are not relatives and
“are committed to one another to the same extent as married
139
persons are to each other.”
In addition to its definitional qualifications, the Minneapolis
140
City Council attempted to narrow its compliance requirements.
The ordinance applies to the portions of a contractor’s operations
that occur “within the City” or “[e]lsewhere within the United
141
States where work related to a contract is being performed.” The
statute leaves unclear what exactly these terms mean to a contractor
whose operations overlap, or whose employees’ work bears an
142
indirect relationship to other employees’ work.
The ordinance
also states that contractors need only offer domestic partner
134. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d)
(2003).
135. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c)
(2003).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(i), (j)
(2003).
141. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(i)(1),
(3) (2003).
142. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(i)(1),
(3) (2003).
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143

benefits during the duration of the contract with the City.
Employers must create and implement a domestic partner registry
144
for their employees before bidding with the city, however.
The
ordinance applies to subcontractors as well as contractors, adding
145
significant breadth to its scope.
C. Exceptions

Several noteworthy exceptions to the ordinance exist.
Contractors that need not comply with the ordinance include those
with a grant or agreement with a public agency, government
146
147
entities, and religious organizations and institutions.
Further,
the city council itself may grant exceptions to the ordinance in
response to an emergency or if it is in the “best interests” of the
148
City.
Factors the city council can use to determine “best
interests” include whether any bidder can comply with the
ordinance, the services are unique and can be provided by only one
bidder, there is only one bidder, and the City would gain
149
“substantial cost savings” by granting an exception.
VI. DOES MINNEAPOLIS’ RECENT DOMESTIC PARTNER ORDINANCE
COMPLY WITH LILLY?
Minneapolis’ ordinance employs different means to achieve
the same objective of the ordinance struck down in Lilly. The
143. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(j)
(2003).
144. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(f)
(2003).
145. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, §18.200(k)
(2003).
146. It is here that Minneapolis ironically exempts itself from its own
ordinance.
147. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(f)(5)-(8)
(2003). The religious exception ostensibly is Minneapolis’ attempt to avoid First
Amendment difficulties under the Free Exercise Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. I;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“The right of every man to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of or
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be
given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship”).
148. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g)(1)-(2)
(2003).
149. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, §
18.200(g)(2)(b)-(f) (2003).
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question is whether Minneapolis’ domestic partner-city contractor
ordinance should be struck down under Minnesota law as an ultra
150
vires act. An act is ultra vires if it expressly or impliedly conflicts
with state law, or if it is preempted because the state has already
151
It is true that
chosen to legislate in a particular field.
152
Minneapolis’ two domestic partner ordinances
are factually
distinct in that requiring private contractors to provide domestic
partner benefits is not the same as mandating the city do the same
153
for its employees.
Nevertheless, this comment argues that the
ordinance is ultra vires under a Lilly analysis principally because the
overarching objective to legislate municipal benefits, marriage and
family, and anti-discrimination policies beyond the borders of the
154
city remains the same. Applying the Lilly analysis to Minneapolis’
155
recent domestic partner ordinance renders it an ultra vires act.
A. Should Minnesota Law Be Strictly Construed Against the City?
The standard under which a court reviews Minneapolis’
domestic partner benefits ordinance will in large part determine
whether it withstands judicial scrutiny. In Lilly, the implied
necessary powers of the City of Minneapolis to legislate in the
realm of domestic partner benefits were strictly construed vis-à-vis
Minnesota Statutes section 471.61 because such legislation
156
intruded upon three realms of policy occupied by the state. The
rule of Lilly is that the state already occupies three areas of law:
oversight of the provision of insurance benefits for municipal
employees under section 471.61, anti-discrimination law, and
157
marriage law.
If a city intrudes upon any one of these three
areas, state law is strictly construed against the locality because each
150. Ultra vires means “unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or
granted by a corporate charter or by law.” BLACK’S, supra note 44, at 1525.
151. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. Note the distinction
between conflict and preemption, either of which taken separately can render an
ordinance invalid.
152. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200 (2003) &
tit. 7, ch. 142, § 142.20 (1991).
153. Compare MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200
(2003) (requiring city contractors to provide benefits to their employees), with
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 142, § 142.20 (1991)
(providing benefits directly to city employees).
154. See infra Parts V.A.-C. and accompanying text.
155. See infra Parts VI.A.-C. and accompanying text.
156. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995).
157. See id. at 111-13.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/4

22

Bayse: Pulling the Lilly from the Pond? Minneapolis Wades into Domestic
BAYSE - FINAL.DOC

2004]

3/30/2004 10:01 PM

PULLING THE LILLY FROM THE POND?

953

158

is considered a statewide concern. Minneapolis’ recent domestic
partner benefits ordinance may intrude upon state municipal
benefits policy. The Minneapolis ordinance almost certainly
intrudes upon state anti-discrimination and family policies in the
same way as Minneapolis’ first domestic partner benefits ordinance.
Whether the Minneapolis ordinance intrudes upon the realm
of state municipal benefits policy is unclear. Section 471.61 of
Minnesota Statutes provides:
A . . . municipal corporation . . . other political subdivision
or other body corporate and political of this state . . . may
insure or protect its or their officers and employees, and
their dependents, or any class or classes of officers,
employees, or dependents, under a policy or policies or
contract or contracts of group insurance benefits
covering . . . medical and surgical benefits and
hospitalization insurance or benefits for both employees
and dependents . . . . A payment is deemed to be
additional compensation paid to the officers or
159
employees.
Thus, the state affirmatively grants municipalities the power to
160
insure their own employees’ dependents. Depending on how the
court interprets the statute, this could mean one of two things.
Broadly interpreted, the statute means that the state occupies the
161
realm of municipal employee benefits policy. This interpretation
would lend itself to a strict construction against Minneapolis’ power
to mandate contractors provide employee benefits. Narrowly
interpreted, the statute shows the state occupies policies
surrounding the provision of benefits to municipal employees only,
162
lending itself to a broad construction of city power.
That
interpretation would avoid a strict construction of the City’s powers
under state law.
This dispute over statutory interpretation can be settled by
looking to the policy issue that undergirds statutory construction of
municipal powers, which is to avoid city intrusion into matters of
163
statewide concern.
Viewed in this light, Minneapolis’ ordinance
158. Id. at 113.
159. MINN. STAT. § 471.61, subd. 1 (2002).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995).
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reaches further beyond city boundaries than did its first. Whereas
164
the first ordinance applied only to city employees, the second
potentially applies to any contractor within the state with more
165
than twenty employees.
Still, the first of the three bases for
determining that the City’s first ordinance concerned a statewide
problem is open to debate.
While some question exists as to whether Minneapolis’ city
contractor ordinance intrudes upon the realm of state municipal
benefits policy, the two other factors the Lilly court used to find
that the first ordinance legislated in a matter of statewide concern
remain applicable. First, the City still attempts to legislate in the
realm of domestic partner benefits, which the Lilly Court said dealt
166
with “the statewide problem of discrimination.” Second, under a
Lilly analysis, domestic partnership laws deal with “the definition of
family relationships and dependent status,” which the court said
167
are “statewide concerns.”
Under the Lilly framework, Minneapolis’ domestic partner-city
contractor ordinance enters at least two, maybe three, fields of law
occupied by the state. Therefore, the power of the City to require
city contractors to provide domestic partner benefits should be
168
construed narrowly, provided that Lilly is upheld.
B. Does Minneapolis’ Recent Domestic Partner Benefits Ordinance
Conflict with State Law, or Is It Preempted by State Public Policy?
Given that the City’s powers should be narrowly construed, the
ordinance is ripe to be struck down if it in any way conflicts with
169
state statutory law.
“Municipal legislation must also comply with
the state constitution, and with state public policy as disclosed in
170
the general law.”
A close analysis reveals that the ordinance is
not entirely harmonious with state law and public policy with
164. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 142 (1991).
165. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c)
(2003).
166. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 111.
167. Id. at 113.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 111 (stating that the cities have no power to legislate in areas
“expressly or impliedly withheld” by the state (quoting State ex rel. Lowell v. City
of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526, 528, 91 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1958)); Lilly v. City of
Minneapolis, 1994 WL 315620 at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1994) (conclusion of law no.
9) (same).
170. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 1994 WL 315620 at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1994)
(conclusion of law no. 9) (citing Lowell, 252 Minn. at 528, 91 N.W.2d at 83).
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regard to municipal benefits, family, and anti-discrimination policy.
The first issue is whether the Minneapolis ordinance conflicts
with Minnesota Statutes section 471.61. Section 471.61 only
authorizes a city to “insure or protect its . . . employees . . . and
171
their dependents.”
In the absence of express authorization
permitting a municipality to mandate benefits for contracting
172
employees, a Minnesota city may not have such authority.
A
municipality, perhaps, is only expressly given the statutory power to
173
insure its own employees.
Requiring city contractors to provide
domestic partner benefits could be an ultra vires act because
Minnesota cities have the authority only to provide employment
174
benefits to their own employees. On the other hand, it could be
argued that section 471.61 only relates to benefits municipalities
can offer their own employees, and has nothing to say about cities
175
dealing with their contractors.
If that were so, then no conflict
176
Hence,
would exist between the ordinance and section 471.61.
the characterization game: Is section 471.61 a statute about a city’s
power to provide benefits generally or simply city benefits to city
employees?
It is here that a court’s standard of statutory
177
construction becomes relevant.
Because family and antidiscrimination policies are deemed to be statewide concerns, the
178
state statute must be construed narrowly.
Under a narrow
construction of state law, the City again finds itself in trouble
because section 471.61 authorizes cities only to offer benefits to the
179
beneficiaries of their own employees.
In addition to conflicting with section 471.61, Minneapolis’
ordinance should also be preempted because it treads upon state
domestic relations and marriage policy, both of which are fields of

171. MINN. STAT. § 471.61 subd. 1 (2002) (emphasis added).
172. See Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 1984).
173. See MINN. STAT. § 471.61 (“A municipal corporation . . . may insure or
protect its . . . officers and employees”) (emphasis added).
174. See MINN. STAT. § 471.61 (2002).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995).
178. See id.
179. An even more interesting question is whether cities can require that
benefits be given to contractors’ employees that they cannot offer their employees.
That is, to what extent does a city have the right to mandate that private
contractors do something that it cannot do itself?
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180

law reserved by and for the state.
Minnesota law expressly and
pervasively speaks to the area of domestic relations and the benefits
181
to be derived from state recognized marital relationships.
Indeed, Minnesota has a long-standing public policy to provide
182
state recognition and benefits to marriage as the state defines it.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Baker
183
v. Nelson, was among the first courts to uphold a state statute
184
Minnesota statutes define
prohibiting same-sex marriage.
185
marriage as between one man and one woman.
In 1997,
Minnesota passed a Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) expressly
186
In
prohibiting marriage between persons of the same sex.
addition, Minnesota statutes expressly disclaim any condoning,
authorization, or recognition of “homosexuality, bisexuality, or any
187
equivalent lifestyle.” Most recently, Minnesota repealed the state
law enabling state agencies to offer domestic partner benefits to
188
state employees. Taken together, Minnesota case law and statutes
180. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 113 (stating that the definition of family
relationships is a statewide concern); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 1994 WL 315620
at *8 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1994) (stating “marriage is the essence of [the d]efendant’s
argument”).
181. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.54 subd. 5 (2002) (legislating in the area of
domestic relations, including benefits considered as income concerning the
disbursement of marital property upon dissolution of marriage).
182. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
183. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
184. Id. at 315, 191 N.W.2d at 187; Bradley J. Betlach, The Unconstitutionality of
the Minnesota Defense of Marriage Act: Ignoring Judgments, Restricting Travel and
Purposeful Discrimination, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 407, 412 (1998) (noting
“[w]hile challenging the prohibition of same-sex marriage may have seemed
ripe . . . Baker was clearly a case before its time.”).
185. MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2002).
186. See MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (2002). “On May 16, 1997, the [DOMA]
legislation easily passed 54-12 in the Senate and 112 to 19 in the House.” Betlach,
supra note 184, at 427. The date is potentially significant because Minnesota did
not have a DOMA statute when Lilly was decided in 1995. Thus, an even stronger
public policy favoring marriage exists in Minnesota than when Lilly was decided.
187. MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (2002).
188. See Act of Apr. 10, 2003, ch. 11, 2003 Minn. Laws S.F. No. 293, § 1 subd.
19(a) available at http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/slaws/2003/c011.html (last
visited March 6, 2004) (“Any provision of a collective bargaining agreement or
compensation plan in this section that provides a benefit based on a person’s
status as a domestic partner of a state employee is not ratified and must not be
implemented.”). “State worker contracts were ratified by the Legislature [during
the 2003 legislative session], but they were missing a provision that provides health
benefits for same-sex domestic partners.
Former Gov. Jesse Ventura’s
administration included the offering in most union contracts for 2002-03.”
Associated Press Newswires, How Some Major Issues Are Faring in the 2003 Legislative
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indicate that the state has clearly chosen to occupy the field of
marriage policy.
Reasonable minds could potentially differ on whether
domestic partner benefits in themselves infringe upon state
marriage policy.
It becomes more difficult to argue that
Minneapolis does not in any way seek to influence, augment, or
protest state marriage policy when the ordinance itself purports to
do as much. One of the stated purposes of the ordinance is to
recognize relationships between adult partners “who are
committed to each other to the same extent as married persons are to
189
each other.”
The ordinance also mandates that contractor
employee benefits be provided to domestic partners if these
benefits are provided “in any manner contingent upon the
190
existence of a marital relationship.”
Assessing the language of a
domestic partner ordinance becomes potentially critical given that
the Georgia Supreme Court, the only other court to rule on state
preemption of municipal domestic partner benefits twice, upheld
Atlanta’s domestic partner ordinance the second time only because
191
Atlanta removed any language relating to marriage.
Unlike
Atlanta, Minneapolis made no attempt to draw a distinction
between its domestic partner benefits law and state marriage
192
policy.
The City Council could have crafted words that do not
indicate a clear intent to enter the realm of marriage policy in
193
drafting its domestic partner ordinance, but it chose not to do so.
In crafting its ordinance, Minneapolis plainly disregarded Lilly.
In addition to state family policy, Minneapolis’ ordinance has
the potential to intrude upon the realm of state anti-discrimination
policy, thereby triggering preemption. The Lilly court ruled that

Session, May 20, 2003, 05/20/03 APWIRES 18:52:00, WL ALLNEWSPLUS Library.
189. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a)
(2003) (emphasis added). The full passage in pertinent part reads:
The City of Minneapolis recognizes that a nationwide debate has
advanced an expanded concept of familial relationship beyond
traditional, marital relationships. This expanded concept includes
relationships between two (2) non-married, adult partners who are
committed to one another to the same extent as married persons are
to each other, except for the traditional marital status and solemnities.
190. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d)
(2003) (emphasis added).
191. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
192. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a)
(2003).
193. Id.
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discrimination policy is a power of the state and is not to be altered
194
The legislative intent of Minnesota’s
by municipal legislation.
Human Rights Act shows that by adding sexual orientation to its
non-discrimination policies, the state had no intent of creating
195
domestic partner benefits.
Indeed, the statute itself expressly
196
disclaims recognition of alternative lifestyles. It could be argued
that Minneapolis did affect state discrimination policy in enacting
domestic partner benefits legislation. Yet, the wording of the
ordinance again suggests that this is precisely what the City
197
attempted to do.
The ordinance states, “no contractor shall
198
Wording
discriminate . . . in the provision of employee benefits.”
aside, logic dictates that if Minneapolis’ first attempt to legislate in
the area of domestic partner benefits was preempted on the basis
that the state occupies the field of anti-discrimination policy, then
so does its city contractor ordinance; domestic partner benefits are
equally related to anti-discrimination policy when provided by city
contractors as compared to the city itself.
Under a Lilly framework, Minneapolis’ ordinance conflicts
with Minnesota statutes and is preempted by state public policy.
Because the state already occupies the fields of marriage and antidiscrimination policy, Minneapolis law must be in accord with state
law in every reasonable respect. At minimum, some discord exists
between state and city law with regard to marriage and antidiscrimination policy.
C.

Reconsidering Lilly
1. Potential Arguments against Lilly

As is apparent thus far, the wording of the Minneapolis
ordinance offers the City little room to argue that the ordinance is
not an attempt to legislate in the realm of state family and anti-

194. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995) (noting that discrimination policy is a “statewide
concern”); City of Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights v. Univ. of Minn., 356
N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
195. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
196. See MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (2002) (stating that the statute should not be
“construed to authorize the recognition of or the right of marriage between
persons of the same sex).
197. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d)
(2003).
198. See id. (emphasis added).
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199

discrimination policies.
If Minneapolis’ domestic partner-city
contractor ordinance is to be upheld, the City will have to argue
against Lilly. Although it is always an uphill battle to argue against
precedent, some grounds for questioning Lilly do exist.
In order to challenge Lilly, Minneapolis must attempt to
narrow the realm of state family policy to exclude domestic partner
benefits by insisting that domestic partner benefits are not an
attempt to infringe upon state policy concerning marriage and
200
family. Some authority exists from other jurisdictions supporting
201
In the absence of state legislation directly
such a claim.
concerning state benefits, the City could argue that the field of
family policy triggering preemption by the state does not include
benefits to non-marital partners. To support such a proposition,
the City could draw the distinction that “[m]arriage is generally a
relationship between two individuals and the state, whereas, a
domestic partner benefit plan is a relationship between two
individuals and an employer or between two individuals and a
202
municipality.” In addition, the City could point out that marriage
still conveys a host of legal rights emanating from the state that
203
The City could argue state family
domestic partnerships do not.
204
policies merely place an affirmative burden on city governments
to support and encourage marriage. This burden need not
205
exclude providing certain rights to domestic partners.
Even if Minneapolis successfully argues its domestic partner
ordinance is harmonious with state family law, the City must

199. See supra Part VI.B.
200. Cf. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995) (holding that Minneapolis’ first domestic
partner ordinance intrudes upon the definition of family relationships, which is a
statewide concern).
201. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
202. Debbie Zielinski, Domestic Partnership Benefits: Why Not Offer Them to SameSex Partners and Unmarried Opposite Sex Partners?, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 281, 296 (1999)
(citing Demian, Comparing Legal Marriage/Ceremonial Marriage/Domestic Partner
Benefits at http://www.buddybuddy.com/mar-comp.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2003)).
203. See id. at 296-98. Some of the rights married partners enjoy but domestic
partners would not enjoy under a domestic partner benefits law include certain
property rights, child custody, crime victim’s recovery, divorce protections,
domestic violence intervention, exemption of property taxes upon a partner’s
death, immunity from testifying, joint adoption and foster care, joint bankruptcy,
medical decisions on behalf of a partner, and wrongful death benefits. Id.
204. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
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additionally discredit the analysis in Lilly that municipal antidiscrimination policy related to domestic partners is a realm of
206
policy normally occupied by the state.
It does appear odd that
207
Minneapolis has a Human Rights Commission, yet any policy
regarding anti-discrimination benefits is subject to a high standard
208
of judicial scrutiny.
The Lilly court did not explain why the City
had the “home rule” power to establish a city Human Rights
Commission but lacked the “home rule” power to fully act in the
209
area of discrimination policy.
Supposing that Minneapolis can undermine the Lilly rationale
210
for strictly construing state law against the City, it still must
demonstrate that a broader construction of state law would allow
211
for domestic partner benefits.
The dissent in Lilly provides the
206. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995) (stating that the court disagreed with the city’s
contention that its action was of local concern only and not in conflict with state
law).
207. Minneapolis has a Human Rights Commission established by the City
Council. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 141, § 141.40
(2003). The Commission’s mandate is to:
Seek to prevent and eliminate bias and discrimination because of race,
color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, affectional preference,
disability, age, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, or
familial status by means of education, persuasion, conciliation and
enforcement, mediation and the impartial resolution and adjudication
of disputes, and utilize all the powers at its disposal to carry into
execution the provisions of this title.
MINNEAPOLIS CODE § 141.40(a) (emphasis added). Minneapolis also has other
declarations of state anti-discrimination policy; see MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF
ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139 §§ 139.10 et seq. (2003). The ordinance reads, in
pertinent part:
It is the public policy of the City of Minneapolis and the purpose of
this title . . . [t]o prevent and prohibit all discriminatory practice based
on race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, including
sexual harassment, affectional preference, disability, age, marital status,
or status with regard to public assistance with respect to employment,
labor union membership, housing accommodations, property rights,
education, public accommodations or public services.
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139, § 139.10(b)(2) (2003).
208. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 111 (noting that when local legislation involves a
statewide problem, the court must apply the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
“directive to ‘narrowly construe’ the city’s power to act ‘unless the legislature has
expressly provided otherwise.’ ”) (citing Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117,
120 (Minn. 1984)).
209. Barron, supra note 70, at 2356 n.411.
210. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 111.
211. Cf. id. (“If a matter presents a statewide problem, the implied necessary
powers of a municipality to regulate are narrowly construed . . .”). It is not clear
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most obvious grounds for interpreting Minnesota statutes to allow
212
for domestic partner benefits legislation. The crux of the dissent
is that in the absence of express statutory prohibition of a city
213
ordinance, the ordinance should be upheld.
The dissent lists
statutes that do in fact expressly limit city power to show that the
legislature can act directly when it seeks to prevent city action on a
214
particular matter. Thus, the City could argue that in the absence
of an express statutory prohibition against cities mandating
domestic partner benefits be provided to their contractors, no
conflict with state law exists.
2. Arguments for Preserving Lilly
Minneapolis’ potential arguments that family and
discrimination policies do not occupy the realm of domestic
partner benefits ultimately fall short. While state family policy
never expressly excludes domestic partner benefits, Minnesota
statutes make it clear that the state legislature has no desire to
endorse or promote familial relationships outside of traditional
215
marriage.
Further, numerous scholars, including those who
support domestic partner benefits legislation, have recognized the
essential nexus between domestic partner benefits and state family
216
or marriage policy.
what a non-narrow (broad) construction of a state statute would be, but it would
doubtless be more deferential in allowing for cities to enact ordinances that do
not directly conflict with state statutes.
212. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 113-16 (Schumacher, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 114 (noting “[i]t is well-settled that a home rule city cannot pass
legislation that ‘permits what [a] statute forbids’ . . . [but t]here is no language in
Minn. Stat. § 471.61 that forbids a home rule charter city from expanding the list
of employee healthcare benefits.”) (citation omitted).
214. Id. For example, Judge Schumacher cited Minnesota Statutes section
471.633 (1992), which provided that the ‘“legislature preempts all authority of a
home rule charter’ city to regulate firearms except as expressly provided by that
statute.” Id.
215. See MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (2002).
216. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND
THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS, 115-18 (2002) (observing that movements toward
recognizing different forms of marriage and family throughout Europe and North
America have empirically moved in gradual, parallel, and consistent increments);
Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the
Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF
NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 441 (Robert Wintemute &
Mads Andenas eds., 2001) (noting that the groundwork for same-sex marriage in
the Netherlands was laid out by other, more incremental legal changes, and how
each legal step leads closer to same-sex marriage); Frances N. Balonwu, Rights and
Entitlement of Same-Sex Cohabitants: Should Gays and Lesbians Have a Right to Their
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The argument that discrimination is not a statewide problem
also runs into trouble because the state has long entered and
217
occupied the realm of employment discrimination policy.
Apparently, even the drafters of the ordinance establishing the City
Commission on Human Rights recognized that the commission is
218
ultimately subordinate to state law. The ordinance notes that the
Partners’ Employment Benefits?, 23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 483, 498 (1998) (noting
“[o]ne of the goals of the gay and lesbian community is to expand the meaning of
‘family’ so that same-sex couples are legally protected”) (citing Libby Post, The
Question of Family: Lesbians and Gay Men Reflecting on Redefined Society, 19 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 747, 748 (1992)); Shoshana Bricklin, Legislative Approaches to Support
Family Diversity, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 379, 380 (1998) (characterizing
Philadelphia’s Domestic Partnership Bill as part of “the campaign for family
diversity rights”); M.R. Carrillo-Heian, Domestic Partnership in California: Is It a Step
Toward Marriage?, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 475, 488, 492 (2000) (arguing that
domestic partnerships, while inferior to same-sex marriage, are a plausible
alternative for states who wish to confer the legal benefits of marriage without
actually calling it “marriage”); Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining
Traditional Family Benefits through Litigation, Legislation, and Collective Bargaining, 15
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 93, 131 (2000) (linking a proposed Madison domestic partner
ordinance with “[t]he fight to obtain legislative extension of alternative family
benefits”); Development in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family: Inching Down the
Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States
and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2009 (2003) (observing that “[t]he path of
reform has been remarkably consistent in each of the European countries that
have legalized same-sex partnerships, leading one scholar to label it a ‘necessary
process,’ in which each step in the expansion of civil rights is critical to enabling
the next) (citations omitted); James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict
Domestic Partnerships to Same-Sex Couples, 8 L. & SEXUALITY 649, 649 (1998) (noting
that “[domestic] partnerships are often viewed as . . . a way of according economic
and legal equality to gay and lesbian couples while withholding the magic
symbolism of ‘marriage’ ”); Steven N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnerships Benefits:
Redefining Family in the Work Place, 6 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 49, 49 (1994) (noting
that the domestic partnership movement sprang up as a result of the fact that
“lesbians and gay men are not allowed to marry”); Libby Post, The Question of
Family: Lesbians and Gay Men Reflecting a Redefined Society, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 747,
748 (stating that “the goal of the lesbian and gay community today [in pushing for
domestic partnership legislation] is to expand the meaning of ‘family’ ”). Cf.
Charles R.P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequality, 7
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 363, 365 (1998) (drawing a distinction between
domestic partnership legislation and the same-sex marriage movement, and
arguing domestic partnerships are preferable as an alternative, rather than
movement toward, same-sex marriage). Recall that the Minneapolis ordinance
also states its purpose is to redefine familial relationships. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a).
217. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (2002) (prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of “race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status,
status with regard to public assistance, disability, sexual orientation, or age”).
218. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 141, § 141.90
(2003) (stating that “No matter shall be heard . . . pursuant to the provisions of
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Commissioner cannot act on matters “previously considered by the
219
The mere
State of Minnesota Commissioner of Human Rights.”
fact that Minnesota has a Board of Human Rights suggests the
legislature thought discrimination was a statewide, rather than
220
purely local, problem.
Undermining the Lilly preemption
rationale would also undermine the decision in City of Minneapolis
221
Commission on Civil Rights v. University of Minnesota, which in the
broadest of terms noted, “[c]ivil rights problems are not confined
to a metropolitan area. They can fairly be stated to be a statewide
problem. [Minnesota law], then, requires a narrow construction of
222
Minneapolis’ powers to regulate civil rights.”
Supposing Minneapolis can convince a court that familial and
anti-discrimination policies are not realms occupied by the state,
even a broader construction of state law probably results in a
conflict between domestic partner benefits ordinances and state
policy. Even broadly construed, Minnesota statutes give cities only
the express power to provide insurance benefits to their own
223
employees.
Further, the Lilly court notes in its discussion of
section 471.61 of Minnesota Statutes that the term “dependents” is
exclusively defined as spouses and minor unmarried children
224
younger than eighteen and dependent students younger than 25.
If a municipality had inherent powers, then perhaps the City could
require benefits to be provided to contractors and make new
categories of beneficiaries like domestic partners. However, a city
225
has no powers save those expressly conferred by statute.
VII. NEW ISSUES RAISED BY THE MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE:
DOES THE ORDINANCE CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW,
OR IS IT PREEMPTED BY STATE CONTRACTING POLICY?
Minneapolis’ domestic partner-city contractor ordinance raises
new issues beyond those raised by Lilly. These issues relate to the
this title when the matter has been previously considered by the State of
Minnesota . . . .”).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. 356 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
222. Id. at 843 (referring to Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120
(Minn. 1984)).
223. See MINN. STAT. § 471.61 subd. 1 (2002).
224. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995).
225. Welsh, 355 N.W.2d at 120.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 4
BAYSE - FINAL.DOC

964

3/30/2004 10:01 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

authority that a “home rule” city has to enact legislation affecting
city contractors rather than the City’s own employees. The City will
want to point out that municipalities are generally given discretion
226
in matters of contracting.
Those opposed to the ordinance will
want to highlight potential conflicts between Minnesota state
contracting policy and the ordinance as well as argue that the state
already occupies the field of mandatory anti-discrimination clauses
in city contracts.
Minneapolis’ domestic partner benefits legislation risks
conflict with state law regarding expenditures for state contracts.
According to Minnesota administrative rules, “[u]nless otherwise
provided for by law, awards for all acquisitions, except building and
227
construction contracts, must be based on best value.”
Yet,
requiring all major contractors with the city to provide domestic
partner benefits has the potential to cost taxpayers across the state
extra money because Minneapolis derives a significant portion of
228
its budget from the state.
The City apparently attempts to avoid
226. See Wichern, supra note 84, at 227.
227. MINN. R. 1230.0800 (2003), available at http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us
/arule/1230/0800.html (last visited March 6, 2004). Municipal legislation that
deals with statewide concerns must fully comply with “state public policy as
disclosed in the general law,” which includes administrative rules. See Lilly v. City
of Minneapolis, 1994 WL 315620, at *3 (conclusion of law no. 9) (Minn. Dist. Ct.
June 3, 1994) (citing State ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn.
526, 91 N.W.2d 81 (1958)).
The term “best value” is somewhat ambiguous on its face, so some historical
explanation may be helpful. Rule 1230.0800, recently updated, previously read,
“[a]ward of contracts shall be made in conformity with Minnesota Statutes, section
16B.09 and with no material variance from the terms and conditions of the bid
invitation.” MINN. R. 1230.0800 (2002). Thus, it is necessary to refer back to
Minnesota statutes for greater clarity. Minnesota statutes previously read:
All state contracts and purchases made by or under the supervision of
the commissioner or an agency for which competitive bids are required
must be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, taking into consideration
conformity with the specifications, terms of delivery, the purpose for
which the contract or purchase is intended, the status and capability of
the vendor, and other considerations imposed in the call for bids.
MINN. STAT. § 16B.09 (1998), repealed by Minn. Laws, ch. 386, art. 1, § 35 (1998).
(emphasis added). Thus, “best value” can best be interpreted to mean lowest
price put forth by a lawful bidder.
The Commissioner of Administration has authority to make or retain rules
related to state contracting in order to best articulate and effectuate state statutes.
The existing statute gives the commissioner the power to “supervise, control,
review, and approve all state contracts and purchasing.” MINN. STAT. § 16B.04
subd. 2(1) (2002).
228. State government funds accounted for roughly thirteen percent of
Minneapolis’ $1.179 billion budget in 2003. City of Minneapolis FY 2003 Budget,
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the appearance of spending extra money on contracts by asserting
that domestic partner benefits improve the quality and value of the
229
goods provided to the city.
The fact remains, however, that
unless the City grants a special exception, it will end up rejecting
lower bids from equally skilled and capable contractors who do not
230
offer domestic partner benefits in favor of contractors who do.
Minneapolis has ample ground to contend that its ordinance
does not conflict with Minnesota administrative law, however. The
City will want to first argue that Rule 1230.0800 does not conflict
with its own contracting practices as a city. In so doing, the City will
want to distinguish Minnesota’s contracting rule from Minnesota
statutes, which historically applied to state contracts and purchases
231
as opposed to municipal ones. Thus, the state law would apply to
232
save money for state contracts, but not necessarily city ones. The
City could additionally point out that municipalities are generally
given broad leeway in awarding city contracts so long as there is no
233
contradiction with state law. The City could also argue that those
who bid for contracts yet do not offer domestic partner benefits are
not lawful bidders within the meaning of Rule 1230.0800 because
234
such bidders do not conform to city requirements.
The City
could argue that its purpose in awarding contracts is to achieve the
highest quality of goods and services possible, and that domestic
partners must be given benefits to achieve “best value” for the
235
state.
In addition to the preceding arguments, the City by analogy
can point to its other regulatory ordinances in place for contractors
who bid for city contracts that are lawful regardless of their
immediate economic impact to the state. These regulations
Financial Overview, at 17, available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/citybudget/2003adopted/TAB3-FinancialOverview.pdf (last visited March 6, 2004).
229. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a)
(2003).
230. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d)
(2003).
231. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
232. Id.
233. See Wichern, supra note 84, at 227.
234. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
235. The Minneapolis ordinance states: “Requiring contractors to provide to
employees with domestic partners benefits equal to those provided to employees
who are married will require contractors to maintain a competitive advantage in
recruiting and retaining the highest quality work force, thereby improving the
quality of goods and services that the city receives.” MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF
ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a) (2003).
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236

include: a fair wage requirement (including a submission of
237
a requirement that no
statements and payroll records),
238
contractor charge its employees fees for obtaining employment,
and a requirement that wages and materials be paid for before the
239
contractor takes its profits. Thus, the city could argue that these
are examples that demonstrate it is within its authority to enact
regulations vis-à-vis city contractors.
The fact that Minneapolis has other regulations that
potentially raise the price on city contracts only has legal
significance, however, if it can be shown that these requirements go
240
beyond the bounds of state law.
In other words, such an
argument carries legal weight only if the city demonstrates that
cities have certain intrinsic powers to enact regulations related to
241
city contracts independent of state public policy in the first place.
It is here that the City’s argument may fall short. The state has
similar statutes requiring state workers to be paid a fair wage, for
242
example.
Minnesota law even expressly authorizes such
243
municipal labor standards.
Therefore, the City’s other labor
236. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 24, § 24.220 (2003)
(stating “all contracts . . . to which the city is a party . . . shall contain a provision
stating that all federal labor standards and prevailing wage provisions applicable to
federal contracts . . . are applicable to this contract . . . and all contractors and
subcontractors shall fully comply with such provisions regardless of any contractual
relationship which may be alleged to exist between the contractor or
subcontractor and his employees.”).
237. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 24, § 24.220 (2003).
238. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 24, § 24.60 (2003)
(stating “[n]o person shall be employed on any public work done by contract for
the city through the agency . . . which charges the employee a fee for securing
such employment . . . .”).
239. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 24, § 24.200 (2003)
(stating city contracts “shall contain a special provision for the payment of the
laborers, employees and those furnishing materials for such work . . . out of the
amount due said contractors from the city, before any part is paid to said
contractors”).
240. See, e.g., State ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526,
528, 91 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1958) (“The adoption of any [city] charter provision
contrary to the public policy of the state, as disclosed by general laws or its penal
code, is . . . forbidden.”).
241. See id.
242. See MINN. STAT. § 177.41 (2002) (requiring that highway workers be paid
“wages of laborers, workers, and mechanics . . . comparable to wages paid for
similar work in the community as a whole”); see also MINN. STAT. § 177.43 subd.
1(2) (2002) (“a laborer or mechanic may not be paid a lesser rate of wages than
the prevailing wage rate”).
243. See MINN. STAT. § 471.345 subd. 7 (2002).
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any municipality
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standards tend to only buttress existing state public policy, leaving
the City as a political subdivision of, rather than an autonomous
244
agent from, the state.
In addition to conflicting with state contracting law, the
ordinance may more directly conflict with, or be preempted by,
existing Minnesota law regarding anti-discrimination policy for
municipal contracts.
In prescribing the anti-discrimination
requirements for all state and municipal contracts, the state’s
criterion does not include domestic partner benefits, or even
sexual orientation:
Every contract for or on behalf of the state of Minnesota,
or any county, city . . . or any other district in the state, for
materials, supplies, or construction shall contain
provisions by which the contractor agrees . . . [t]hat, in
the hiring of common or skilled labor for the
performance of any work under any contract, or any
subcontract, no contractor, material supplier, or vendor,
shall, by reason of race, creed, or color, discriminate
against the person or persons who are . . . qualified and
available to perform the work to which the employment
245
relates.
The statute may conflict with the Minneapolis ordinance. The
246
canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if used to
construe the statute, would indicate an intent by the legislature to
exclude the possibility that cities could add anti-discrimination
247
categories other than race, creed, or color.
Preemption is a
from adopting rules, regulations, or ordinances which establish the
prevailing wage rate as defined in section 177.42, as a minimum
standard for wages and which establish the hours and working
conditions prevailing for the largest number of workers engaged in the
same class of labor within the area as a minimum standard for a
contractor’s employees which must be agreed to by any contractor
before the contractor may be awarded any contract for the furnishing
of any labor, material, supplies, or service.
Id.
244. This is not to say that every city ordinance must match verbatim the terms
of a comparable state statute. However, when presented with a statewide problem
that the state has attempted to address, a Minnesota city cannot act in
contravention to the state. See Lowell, 252 Minn. at 528, 91 N.W.2d at 83.
245. MINN. STAT. § 181.59 (2002).
246. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “that to express or include one
thing implies the exclusion of the other.” BLACK’S, supra note 44, at 602.
247. Minnesota courts have applied the expressio unius construction as an aid in
interpreting legislative intent. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Duluth, 243 Minn. 84,
88-89, 67 N.W.2d 635, 638 (1955).
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possibility as well. The statute potentially indicates the state
intended to occupy the field of mandatory anti-discrimination
provisions in state and city contracts, thus constituting preemption.
Given that the sweeping language of the statute applies to both
state and city governments, both conflict and preemption
arguments appear strong.
Minneapolis’ ordinance raises novel issues related to a city’s
authority to enact contracting policy. The ordinance is probably
ultra vires because it conflicts with state contracting law and is
preempted because the state ostensibly has occupied the field of
law mandating anti-discrimination provisions in state and city
contracts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Minneapolis’ domestic partner ordinance, while a clever
attempt to avoid the Lilly decision, is an exercise beyond the City’s
“home rule” authority. The ordinance either conflicts with state
law or is preempted by state public policies regarding municipal
248
employee
benefits,
marriage,
anti-discrimination,
and
249
contracting.
These factors mean that Minneapolis’ domestic
250
partner ordinance is ultra vires.
This is not to say that Minnesota cities should not have the
leeway to act in matters of primarily local importance. The issue of
domestic partner benefits is much broader than a city issue,
251
however.
Given that Minnesota’s interpretation of “home rule”
252
authority seeks to delineate between state and local functions,
distinctions between statewide and local issues should be made
where possible to preserve the integrity of “home rule” authority.
Domestic partner benefits are an emerging and important
issue best addressed at the state level. The Lilly should stay in the
253
pond, lest the frog of federalism have one less place to rest.

248. See supra Part V.B.
249. See supra Part VI.
250. See supra Parts V-VI. Of course, a court decision would not be necessary if
the Minnesota legislature intervened by passing a statute expressly prohibiting
municipalities from mandating that contractors provide domestic partner benefits.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text.
252. See supra Part III.C and accompanying text.
253. I use federalism in this context to refer to the balance of power between
the state and localities as articulated by the courts in accordance with Minnesota’s
“home rule” authority laws, discussed in Part III, supra.
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